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RECENT DEVElOPlliENTS

United States v. Carlton:
RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF AN
AMENDMENT TO 26
U.S.C. § 2057 (1982,
SUPP. IV 1986) DID
NOT VIOLATE DUE
PROCESS.

A retroactive application of an amendment that restricted useof26 U.S.C. § 2057
(1982, Supp. IV 1986), which
allowed for a deduction of half
the proceeds of a sale of employer securities by the executor of an estate to an employee
stock ownership plan r'ESOP"),
washeldto benon-violative ofthe
Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment ofthe United States
Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court, in UnitedStates
v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994), applied the rational basis test to the amendment and
ruled that the retroactive application was rationally related to
its legislative purpose.
Jerry W. Carlton
("Carlton") was the executor
of the estate of Willametta K.
Day ("Day"). On December
10,1986, Carlton purchased 1.5
million shares ofMCI Communications Corporation with estate funds at an average share
price of $7.47 per share. On
December 12, 1986, Carlton
sold all of the MCI stock to the
MCI ESOP at an average share
price of $7.05 per share. On
December 29, 1986, Carlton
filed an estate tax return claiming a deduction under § 2057 of
$5,287,000.00, half the proceeds of the sale to the MCI
ESOP.
On January 5,1987, the
Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), awaiting the enactment of actual legislation (the
amendment to § 2057), stated
that the § 2057 deduction could
be used by estates of decedents
only in cases where the stock in

question was owned by the decedent immediately prior to
death. The amendment to §
2057 was finally enacted on
December 22, 1987. It was
made effective as if contained
in the statute originally enacted
in October 1986.
The IRS disallowed
Carlton's deduction under §
2057 because the MCI stock
had not been owned by Day
immediately prior to her death.
Carlton was assessed a tax deficiency which he paid with interest. He filed a claim for a refund
and initiated a refund action in
the United States District Court
for the Central District of Califomia. He conceded that the
estate did not qualify for a deduction under § 2057, but argued that retroactive application of the amendment to the
estate's 1986 transactions violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected this argument and granted summaryjudgment in favor of the United
States.
The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
considering two factors to be of
importance when determining
whether retroactive application
of a tax violates due process.
The first factor was whether the
taxpayer had actual or constructive notice that the statute would
be retroactively amended. The
second factor was whether the
taxpayer reasonably relied to
his detriment on the statute before its amendment. The court
ruled that retroactive application of the amendment was un-

duly harsh and oppressive and
thus violative of due process.
Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion for the
United States Supreme Court,
began the analysis by stating
that "[t]his Court repeatedly
has upheld retroactive tax legislation against a due process challenge." I d. at 2021. The Court
noted that the "harsh and oppressive" formulation does not
differ in substance from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation with regard
to economic policy. Id. at 2022.
Hence, the due process test to
be applied to tax statutes with
retroactive effect is the rational
basis test. Under this test, the
legitimate legislative purpose of
the statute must be furthered by
rational means. Id.
The Court found that in
enacting § 2057, Congress never
intended the statute to have such
a broad application. The intent
was to create an incentive for
shareholders to sell to the employees, those who helped build
the company. Id.
The Supreme Court
concludedthatthe 1987 amendment did not violate due process. First, the Court stated that
Congress acted "to correct what
it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 1986 provision that would have created a
significant and unanticipated
revenue loss." Id. at 2023.
Second, Congress had acted
promptly and the period of
retroactivity was only modest.
Id.
The Court rejected
Carlton's argument that he re-

lied on the original provision by
noting that "[t]ax legislation is
not a promise, and a taxpayer
has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code." Id. In
addition, the Court rejected
Carlton's lack of notice argument by quoting Milliken v.
United States, 283 U.S. 15,23
(1931): "a taxpayer 'should be
regarded as taking his chances
ofany increase in the tax burden
which might result from carrying out the established policy of
taxation. '" Id.
.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined, obviously irritated by the majority's opinion,
began his analysis by stating:
"If I thought that 'substantive
due process' were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated
by bait-and-switch taxation."
Id. at 2026. Scalia critiqued the
Court's characterization of the
amendment as "a curative measure" and stated that "what was
done to respondent here went
beyond a 'cure.''' Id. Henoted
that the retroactive disallowance of the tax benefit that the
earlier law allowed, without
compensating those who incurred expenses by accepting
the offer, is "harsh and oppressive by any normal measure."
Id.
Scalia did, however,
express agreement with the
Court that the Due Process
Clause does allow for retroactive taxation, since he believes
that the Clause "guarantees no
substantive rights, but only (as
it says) process .... " Id. at

2027.
In summary, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Carlton that a retroactive amendment restricting use
ofa deduction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2057 (1982, Supp. IV 1986)
was not violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. While such an
amendment may not violate due
process, it certainly violates this
author's perception of what a
free market economy should be.
lt is beyond comprehension that
some legislators fail to see that
what is best for the economy is
to keep this country's assets in
the hands of private individuals.
lt is only private individuals that
have an incentive to efficiently
and productively use these assets. lt is only private individuals that have a "bottom line" to
worry about. The federal government has no such bottom line
to worry about, despite its claims
to the contrary.
The reason for the
amendment to § 2057 was because of an unanticipated revenue loss by the government of
$7 billion over a five-year period. The loss of $7 billion in
revenue over a five-year period
is a minuscule amount given the
size of the United State's
economy as measured by gross
domestic product, or any standard of measurement for that
matter. However, I am sure that
the revenue provided by the
amendment will be put to good
use by the federal government.
I understand that the money is
ear-marked for the coffers of
such successful programs as

welfare, the illicit drug importation war, and the space program. Good luck middle-class

America.

- Paul J. Mantell
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